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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The recent rash of asset market bubbles and bursts has generated increased 
interest in the debate over the efficiency of stock market behavior.  
Recently, beliefs in the efficient market hypothesis (EMH) have been 
challenged by the global financial crisis and the growing literature on 
behavioral finance.  Debates on this topic, however, often fail to take 
sufficiently into account that there are at least two versions of the EMH.  
One is that it is impossible (or at least extremely difficult) for investors to 
systematically beat the market.  A second and much stronger version is that 
markets are not subject to serious biases.  While it has often been assumed 
that the first version implies the second, this is not necessarily the case.  The 
first version holds that markets may be subject to some types of the biases 
pointed out in the literature on behavioral finance as long as they do not 
occur in such a mechanically consistent way that they offer systematically 
exploitable profit opportunities.  While early studies of the Korean stock 
market found signs of inefficiencies,
1)
 it seemed reasonable that the 
efficiency of the market would increase over time as the market becomes 
more fully developed.  Despite the stresses generated by the global financial 
crisis, in recent research Kim (2013) found that the Korean stock market 
passes a number of standard tests for market efficiency.
2)
  Furthermore, 
Narayan and Smyth (2004) tested the efficient market hypothesis using 
monthly South Korean stock price data for the period 1981-2003.  KOSPI 
was consistent with the efficient market hypothesis.
3)
  
In this paper, we investigate whether despite behaving in a manner 
consistent with weak form efficiency, the Korean stock market displays other 
interesting behavioral characteristics.  Drawing on the rapidly expanding 
                                                          
1) See, for example, Pyun and Kim (1991); Ayadi and Pyun (1994); Huang (1995); and 
Hasanov (2009). 
2) Kim (2013) applied the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test, Autocorrelation Function 
(ACF) test, Runs test, and Variance Ratio Test to the behavior of the KOSPI in recent years 
only, in particular, from August 1, 2007 through March 31, 2010. 
3) Narayan and Smyth (2004) applied Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test.  They concluded 
that stock prices for South Korea had a unit root during the research term. 
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literature on behavioral and neuro finance, we investigate several aspects of 
the Korean stock market’s reaction to news during the global financial crisis.  
For this purpose, we established a time frame for the crisis period extending 
from August 1, 2007 to March 31, 2010 for the global financial crisis in 
Korea.  We constructed a new data set of foreign and domestic financial and 
economic news during that time and test several hypotheses about the 
reactions of financial markets to both good and bad news.  We found 
support for the hypothesis that the market responds more strongly to bad 
rather than good news during a crisis period but that this relationship does 
not hold consistently across periods of market upswings and downswings 
during the crisis period. 
We also test for the standard efficient market; the rational expectations 
assumption that the market reacts only to unanticipated news.  We find 
some support for a weak form of this hypothesis where the market reacts to 
our measures both of expected as well as unexpected news, but the response 
to unexpected bad news is much larger than for expected news.  For good 
news, the differences were much smaller.  We also test the hypothesis from 
complexity economics and behavioral finance that contrary to the rational 
expectations hypothesis, there may be large market moves even in the 
absence of major news.  We do not find support for this view over the time 
period investigated. 
In the following section, we explain the behavioral hypotheses tested.  
Section 3 details our development of the data set for news.  Section 4 
explains the research methodology.  Section 5 tests the hypotheses, and 
section 6 offers some concluding remarks. 
 
 
2. THE BEHAVIORAL HYPOTHESES 
 
Behavioral and neuro finance focuses on cognitive limitations of the 
human brain that can lead individuals to make decisions that conflict with 
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rational choice.
4)
  The result is a number of hypotheses about biases in 
financial market behavior.  Some of the most commonly found biases from 
research in cognitive psychology and neuroscience are tendencies toward 
hubris, i.e., over optimism about our abilities, propensities to avoid the 
recognition of uncertainty by putting excessive faith in strong views of the 
world, and confirmation biases that lead to putting excessive weight on 
observations that confirm our prior views and discounting those that conflict.  
The biases all seem to be tendencies that are quite human albeit there are 
ones that conflict with our assumptions about pure economic man.  
Confirmation bias may apply not only to our weighing evidence about the 
correctness of the specific mental models that are used to interpret and 
predict market behavior, but also can interact with respect to general moods 
of optimism and pessimism.  Thus, we may largely ignore specific pieces of 
bad news in good times while placing great weight on them in bad times and 
vice versa. 
Considerable research in cognitive psychology has documented that on 
average, people are strongly biased toward over optimism, even though some 
are excessively pessimistic.
5)
  The biased behaviors of particular groups of 
individuals do not necessarily show up in market prices.  Advocates of the 
efficient market view have always recognized that not all market participants 
will behave rationally, but assume that rational speculators will arbitrage the 
effects of their actions out.  However, where there are ‘limits to arbitrage’ 
such biases may not always be cancelled out.  
Of course, thinking that a hypothesis seems plausible does not assure that 
it is important in practice.  We view the behavioral finance approach that 
offers us a rich set of hypotheses to test.  We would expect to find that some 
of these hypotheses are empirically important while others are not and as 
with the efficient market hypotheses, their relevance may vary in different 
situations.  Here we test several hypotheses. 
The first is that in periods of crisis, bad news would have stronger effects 
                                                          
4) See, for example, Akerlof and Shiller (2009); Burnham (2005); Cohan (2009); Fox (2009); 
Montier (2002); Peterson (2007); Shefrin (2000); Shleifer (2000); and Zweig (2007). 
5) See Sharot (2011). 
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on the market than good news.  This has been previously tested for the 
Asian crisis with somewhat conflicting findings.  Kaminsky and Schmukler 
(1999) found a sizably stronger reaction to bad news during the Asian crisis 
for the days of greatest changes in dollar value in the set of nine Asian stock 
markets.  However, Jo and Willett (2000) found little support for the 
hypothesis that the Asian currency crisis was dominated by panic in the 
markets such that investors and speculators reacted much more strongly to 
bad rather than good news.  Thus, we view this possible bias as an open 
question.  
We further test whether in rising markets market optimism and 
confirmation bias leads the market to pay more attention to good news than 
to bad, while in declining markets, the climate of pessimism leads markets to 
pay more attention to bad news rather than to good news.  We also construct 
proxies for anticipated and unanticipated news to test the rational 
expectations hypothesis, that only unanticipated news moves the market. 
 
 
3. THE DATA SET OF NEWS6) 
 
Data were collected from August 1, 2007 through March 31, 2010.  The 
first date was chosen based on the election of their new president Lee 
Myung-bak who pledged to be an ‘economic president’ and the social mood 
accompanying the regime change.  By that time evidence of the subprime 
mortgage crisis in the United States had begun to become public but the 
magnitude of the problem was not appreciated and it was not until after the 
failure of Lehman Brothers that expectations surfaced that the crisis would 
spread to the emerging market countries.  There is no generally agreed date 
for the end of the crisis and it almost certainly varied from country to 
country.  On March 20, 2010, the Korean government officially declared 
that the economic crisis was over, so we used March 31, 2010 as the end date 
                                                          
6) This data set was constructed by Yoonmin Kim as a part of his dissertation research under 
the direction of Professor Willett. 
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for our sample. 
The data set of news reviewed for this study was collected from three 
major Korean business newspapers on a daily basis: Maeil Business 
Newspaper, Seoul Business Newspaper, and Hankook Business Newspaper.  
The criterion for the one most important daily news item that was chosen 
from all three newspapers was that it must have been located on the front or 
second page (top 20 economic and business news on that day).  If there 
were multiple news items that satisfied our standard of substantial news, the 
news from the crisis timeline of events and policy actions from the Federal 
Reserve Bank of Saint Louis were chosen.  
Our classification of good and bad news follows Baig and Goldfajn (1999) 
and Jo and Willett (2000).  Examples of good news are credible economic 
reforms, upgraded credit ratings, the removal of capital controls, good 
economic indicators (such as lower inflation rate, trade surplus, etc.), 
financial aid agreements, news forecasts of a better economic outlook, and 
political stability.  
Bad News includes financial troubles or bankruptcies of firms, non-
credible economic reforms, downgrades in credit ratings, reports that 
indicated conflicts with international organizations, the imposition of capital 
controls, and worse than expected economic indicators (such as a higher 
inflation rate, etc.).  News items that could not be defined clearly were 
excluded. The financial information came from S&P, Google Finance, 
KOSIS (Korean Statistical Information System), KOSCOM (Korea Securities 
Computing Corporation), and the Korean Stock Exchange Database.  
The news we coded may not have been the only factor influencing stock 
price movements that day.  To control for regional or global developments 
that might influence the KOSPI, we also calculate returns adjusted for returns 
of the S&P Global 1200 index and MSCI_EM index.
7)
  It does not seem 
clear whether the adjusted or unadjusted returns are most relevant and for the 
adjustments, whether the global or EM index is most appropriate.  Likely, 
                                                          
7) See Appendix A2 for a full description of S&P Global 1200 Index, European Index, and 
MSCI_EM Index. 
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this will vary from one type of news to another.  Thus, we report all three 
estimates.  Fortunately, there turns out to be little difference in the stories 
they tell.  
Of course, in efficient markets, rational expectations models news is 
‘news’ only if it is unanticipated.  Thus, we developed a coding that 
distinguished between anticipated and unanticipated news.  In order to 
determine which news is expected or unexpected, soft news items such as 
rumors and discussions of possible future policy actions were excluded and 
only hard news such as policy actions and data releases were checked.  We 
read all of the hard news articles.  If there was related soft news a few days 
before the hard news, the hard news was considered ‘expected news’.  If 
there was no soft news related to the hard news or the soft news was totally 
opposite from later hard news, the hard news was considered ‘unexpected 
news’.  Since each central bank in each country announces interest rate 
adjustments on a specific day, most of the news related to interest rate 
adjustments are considered ‘expected news’.8)  However, we read all of the 
news articles one by one and if there was any nuance that the interest rate 
adjustment was a surprise, we categorized the news as ‘unexpected news’.  
Fortunately, there was no ambiguous news to try to figure out after applying 
these methods. 
 
 
4. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
To investigate how and which news affects the KOSPI index returns, 
event-study methodology will be employed primarily with OLS regression 
methodology employed as a supplementary methodology.
9)
  
In the case of OLS regression methodology, the dependent variable 
                                                          
8) For example, the Bank of Korea determines the central interest rate on the second thursday 
of each month.  In the case of FRB, FOMC determines the federal interest rate every six 
weeks on tuesdays (8 times a year). 
9) Jo and Willett (2000) and Dooley and Hutchison (2009) used this methodology for their 
research. 
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explained here is the daily return change in the KOSPI.  The OLS 
regression methodology focuses on which type of news indicated a range of 
financial and real economic topics during the research term, that had 
statistically and economically large impacts on Korean stock market 
(KOSPI). 
In the case of event study methodology, Mackinley’s (1997) standard 
protocol of event study was followed.  Central to an event study is the 
measurement of abnormal returns (AR), which put simply is actual returns 
minus expected returns (Armitage, 1995).  The very method of event studies 
generally has come to refer to procedures used to estimate abnormal returns 
and testing their level of significance.  
The abnormal return is the actual ex post return of KOSPI over the event 
window, minus the normal return of KOSPI over the event window.  S&P 
Global 1200 index or MSCI_EM index will be the market return in this 
research.  In other words, the S&P Global 1200 index or MSCI_EM index 
will be used as the explanatory variable to account for common external 
shocks in KOSPI. 
 
( | ),
t t t t
AR R E R X                     (1) 
 
where 
t
AR  is an abnormal return on KOSPI, Rt is the actual return on 
KOSPI, and ( )
t t
E R X  is the normal return on KOSPI. 
 
ˆˆ ,
t t mt
AR R R                       (2) 
 
where 
t
R  is the return on KOSPI and mtR  is the value weighted market 
index return (S&P Global 1200 or MSCI_EM).  The abnormal return ARt is 
the disturbance term of the market model.  
In order to compute the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) of event j, 
this researcher deleted periods covered by the event windows from the 
sample, estimated the market model by regressing Rt on Rmt, and computed 
the CARs of an event by summing the forecast errors during its event 
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window (the second method in Filson, 2004).  For event windows, Filson 
(2004) explains that the market often begins taking action to forthcoming 
announcements two days in advance as information leaks out and that the 
announcement typically appears in the Wall Street Journal the day after the 
information is released.  Therefore, Filson used an event window that 
ranges two days prior and one day after [–2, 1] the announcement day.  
However, this research is about macroeconomic announcements and the 
overall stock market (KOSPI) and not about a business.  There should be 
few effects of information leaks, making the appropriate event window a lot 
shorter than Filson’s.  According to Efficient Market Hypothesis, when 
information arises, the news spreads very quickly and is incorporated in the 
prices of securities without delay.  Also, the basis of efficient market 
hypothesis is that the market consists of many rational investors who are 
constantly reading the news and react quickly to any new significant 
information about a security.  Therefore, we used an event window of [0, 0].
10)
  
 
1 2
2
1
C ( ,  ) .
τ
τ
AR AR
 
 

                     (3) 
 
The CARs from 
1
  to 
2
  are the sum of the included abnormal returns.   
The CARs of an event are computed by summing abnormal returns during its 
event window.  The aggregate CARs are computed for the each news item. 
 
 
5. RESULTS ON NEWS AND THE BEHAVIORAL  
HYPOTHESES 
 
Hypothesis 1: Investors in KOSPI react more strongly to bad news 
than good news during a crisis period. 
                                                          
10) Kang and Yoon (2014) mentioned the intraday spillover effect of information between the 
Korean and Japanese Stock markets becomes smaller in a very short time as an increase in 
time-intervals.  They checked the intraday spillover effect of 10-minute intraday returns, 
30-minute intraday returns, and 1-hour intraday returns.  
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Table 1 The Impact Effects of Good and Bad News on the KOSPI 
Event 
KOSPI’s  
Own Return 
(1) 
Returns adjusted 
with Global 
Index  
(S&P G1200) 
(2) 
Returns 
adjusted with 
Global Index 
(MSCI_EM)  
(3) 
Number of 
Observations 
Good News 
1.46 
  (13.13)
***
 
1.22 
(10.63)
***
 
1.23 
(10.83)
***
 
188 
Bad News 
–1.83  
   (–16.11)*** 
–1.55 
(–13.17)*** 
–1.56 
(–13.46)*** 
179 
The Significance 
Tests for the 
Differences 
between the 
Coefficients 
*** 
[100%] 
*** 
[100%] 
*** 
 [100%] 
 
Notes: 1) Figures in parentheses ( ) indicate t-values.  2) Figures in parentheses [ ] indicate p-
values.  3) *** denotes statistical significance at 1%, ** 5%, and * 10%, respectively. 
 
For the first tests, we examined the impact effects from all forms of good 
and bad news on the KOSPI.  OLS regression methodology was employed 
for KOSPI’s own return on news.  Each piece of news was considered an 
event and abnormal return patterns were checked after the news events.  
 
1 2
_ .
t t t t
KOSPI R GN BN                    (4) 
 
KOSPI_Rt is ‘the daily return of KOSPI index’ and is measured in three 
ways, KOSPI’s own return, returns adjusted with the Global Index (S&P 
G1200), and returns adjusted with the Global Index (MSCI_EM).  In this 
analysis, GNt is a dummy variable for ‘good news’, and BNt is a dummy 
variable for ‘bad news’.  These dummy variables take a value of 1 for good 
news or for bad news and zero if there is no news of that type during a 
specific day. 
As shown in table 1 for KOSPI’s own returns, a larger effect of bad rather 
than good news was found, 1.83 versus 1.46 percent.  As expected, looking 
at the changes in the KOSPI relative to other market indices yielded smaller 
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coefficients, implying that the Korean and foreign stock markets typically 
moved in the same directions, but the differences between good and bad 
news remained statistically significant. 
 
Hypothesis 2: Investors in KOSPI react more strongly to bad news in 
negative momentum and to good news in positive momentum. 
 
Next, since the period covered displayed both an up and down swing we 
were able to test the hypotheses concerning differential reactions to good and 
bad news during rising versus falling markets as a type of test of 
confirmation bias.  This hypothesis suggests that markets would pay more 
attention to the news that fits with their prior expectations so that bad news 
would have less impact than good news during an upswing while it would 
have less effect during a down turn. 
In order to find positive and negative momentum, one method used was 
based on the KOSPI 200 index and KOSPI 200 Future index (KOSPI Future 
one-month).  KOSPI 200 is listed on futures and option markets.  The 
basis was checked, which is the value differential between a forward price 
(future) and spot price (future price minus spot price).  Contango is the 
market condition where the price of a forward or futures contract is above the 
expected spot price at contract maturity (one month).  When Contango 
occurred in the KOSPI 200 market, we defined the day as having ‘positive 
momentum’.  Backwardation is the market condition where the price of a 
forward or future contract is trading below the expected spot price at contract 
maturity.  When backwardation occurred in the KOSPI 200 market, it was 
defined as having ‘negative momentum’.  
For rising and falling markets, an alternative method was used by dividing 
the market into periods of general rise and general fall (5-day moving 
average and 30-day moving average).  Among the measures, the 30-day 
moving average was employed to delineate rising and falling markets 
because 30-day moving average shows the result of this research most 
clearly. 
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Table 2 The Impact Effects of News with Momentum on the KOSPI 
Event 
KOSPI’s 
Own Return 
(1) 
Returns 
adjusted with 
Global Index 
(S&P G1200) 
(2) 
Returns 
adjusted with  
Global Index 
(MSCI_EM) 
(3) 
Number of 
Observations 
Good News with  
Positive 
Momentum 
1.30 
   (8.38)
***
 
1.04 
(6.19)
***
 
1.08 
(6.47)
***
 
98 
Good News with  
Negative 
Momentum 
1.63 
   (10.18)
***
 
1.42 
(9.10)
***
 
1.39 
(9.10)
***
 
90 
The Significance  
Tests for the  
Differences between  
the Coefficients 
Not Significant 
[82.72%] 
* 
[90.61%] 
Not Significant 
[83.97%] 
 
Bad News with  
Positive 
Momentum 
–1.46 
   (–7.08)*** 
–1.22 
(–7.75)*** 
–1.20 
(–7.88)*** 
54 
Bad News with  
Negative 
Momentum 
–1.99 
  (–14.68)*** 
–1.70 
(–11.05)*** 
–1.72 
(–11.34)*** 
125 
The Significance  
Tests for the  
Differences between  
the Coefficients 
** 
[95.3%] 
* 
[93.75%] 
** 
[96.16%] 
 
Notes: 1) Figures in parentheses ( ) indicate t-values.  2) Figures in parentheses [ ] indicate p-
values.  3) *** denotes statistical significance at 1%, ** 5%, and * 10%, respectively.  
 
1 2
3 4
_ ( * ) ( * )
 ( * ) ( * ) .
  
  
  
  
t t t t t
t t t t t
KOSPI R GN PM GN NM
BN PM BN NM
      (5) 
 
PMt is a dummy variable for ‘Positive momentum’ and NMt is a dummy 
variable for ‘Negative Momentum’.  These dummy variables take a value of 
1 for good news or for bad news, and zero if there is no news of that type 
during a specific day.  Moreover, these dummy variables take a value of 1 
for positive or negative momentum.  
As shown in table 2, the results for KOSPI’s own effects and those 
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adjusted for the other indices are qualitatively similar.  Bad news continues 
to have stronger effects than good news under both rising and falling 
markets, but the difference is less in rising rather than falling markets, 16 
versus 36 basis points for KOSPI’s own returns.  This offers some support 
for the existence of confirmation bias.  The effects of bad news are 
substantially greater in downward rather than in upward moving markets, 
1.99 versus 1.46%, which is also consistent with the hypothesis.  However, 
the effects of good news in rising markets is smaller than the effects of good 
news in falling markets, 1.30 versus 1.63, a difference of 33 basis points 
which is inconsistent with the confirmation bias hypothesis. 
However, this finding is consistent with another behavioral hypothesis; that 
in boom markets, investors get lazy and pay less attention to news, while down 
markets act as a wake up call and investors pay more attention to both good 
and bad news.  With optimistic views deflated, views may be held less strongly, 
leading to a reduction in confirmation bias and hence more attention to both 
good and bad news.
11)
  This is overlaid with the hypothesized tendency for 
market participants to react more strongly to bad news in bad times, which is 
consistent with a general switch in the market from optimism to pessimism. 
The statistical significance of the coefficient difference was also checked 
in this study.  As seen in table 2, in the case of good news, the differential 
between good momentum and bad momentum was significant only in the 
returns adjusted with S&P Global 1200.  In the case of bad news, the 
differential was significant in all the cases.  
 
Hypothesis 3: Investors in KOSPI react more strongly to unexpected 
news than expected news. 
 
1 2 3
4 5 6
7 8
_ ( * ) ( * ) ( * )
 ( * ) ( * ) ( * )
 ( * ) ( * ) .
t t t t t t t
t t t t t t
t t t t t
KOSPI R HPGN E HPGN UE HPBN E
HPBN UE HDGN E HDGN UE
HDBN E HDBN UE
   
  
  
   
  
  
 (6) 
                                                          
11) Such behavior is consistent with the hypothesis developed by Willett et al. (forthcoming) 
that financial markets tend to pay too little attention to developing problems during good 
times and behave more closely to rational expectations during crises. 
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In equation (6) HPGNt is a dummy variable for ‘hard-policy 
announcement-good-news’, HPBNt is a dummy variable for ‘hard-policy 
announcement-bad-news,’ HDGNt is a dummy variable for ‘hard-data 
announcement-good-news,’ HDBNt is a dummy variable for ‘hard-data 
announcement-bad-news,’ Et is a dummy variable for ‘expected,’ and UEt is 
a dummy variable for ‘unexpected’.  These dummy variables take a value of 
1 for all kinds of news, and zero if there is no news for the dummy variables 
 
Table 3a The Impact Effects of Expected and Unexpected Policy  
Announcement News on the KOSPI 
Event 
KOSPI’s  
Own Return  
(1) 
Returns adjusted 
with Global 
Index  
(S&P G1200)  
(2) 
Returns 
adjusted with  
Global Index 
(MSCI_EM) (3) 
Number of 
Observations 
Policy News 
(Good) 
Expected 
1.26 
    (3.54)
***
 
1.19 
(3.46)
***
 
1.17 
(3.54)
 ***
 
22 
Policy News 
(Good) 
Unexpected 
2.33 
   (8.15)
 ***
 
1.90 
(6.86)
 ***
 
1.90 
(6.98)
 ***
 
34 
The Significance 
Tests for the 
Differences 
between the 
Coefficients 
** 
[98.04%] 
Not Significant 
[88.99%] 
* 
[90.68%] 
 
Policy News 
(Bad) 
Expected 
–0.66 
 (–0.89) 
–0.92 
(–1.27) 
–0.97 
(–1.36) 
5 
Policy News 
(Bad) 
Unexpected 
–0.84 
   (–1.83)* 
–0.73 
(–1.64) 
–0.81 
(–1.85) 
13 
The Significance 
Tests for the 
Differences 
between the 
Coefficients 
Not Significant 
[16.36%] 
Not Significant 
[17.10%] 
Not Significant 
[14.44%] 
 
Notes: 1) Figures in parentheses ( ) indicate t-values.  2) Figures in parentheses [ ] indicate p-
values.  3) *** denotes statistical significance at 1%, ** 5%, and * 10%, respectively. 
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Table 3b The Impact Effects of Expected and Unexpected Data 
Announcement News on the KOSPI 
Event 
KOSPI’s  
Own Return  
(1) 
Returns adjusted 
with Global Index  
(S&P G1200)  
(2) 
Returns 
adjusted with  
Global Index 
(MSCI_EM) 
(3) 
Number of 
Observations 
Data News 
(Good) 
Expected 
1.16 
    (4.28)
 ***
 
0.90 
  (3.43)
 ***
 
0.92 
(3.56)
 ***
 38 
Data News 
(Good) 
Unexpected 
1.39 
   (5.59)
 ***
 
1.10 
(4.56)
 ***
 
1.19 
(5.02)
 ***
 45 
The Significance  
Tests for the 
Differences 
between the 
Coefficients 
Not Significant 
[47.05%] 
Not Significant 
[42.02%] 
Not Significant 
[55.93%]  
Data News 
(Bad) 
Expected 
–1.77 
 (–6.01) *** 
–1.41 
(–4.91) *** 
–1.43 
(–5.07) *** 32 
Data News 
(Bad) 
Unexpected 
–1.88 
   (–8.16)*** 
–1.56 
(–6.97)*** 
–1.55 
(–7.02) *** 52 
The Significance 
Tests for the 
Differences 
between the 
Coefficients 
Not Significant 
[24.21%] 
Not Significant 
[33.82%] 
Not Significant 
[26.89%] 
 
Notes: 1) Figures in parentheses ( ) indicate t-values.  2) Figures in parentheses [ ] indicate p-
values.  3) *** denotes statistical significance at 1%, ** 5%, and * 10%, respectively. 
 
in equation (6) during a specific day.  Moreover, these dummy variables 
take a value of 1 for expected or unexpected news. 
As shown in tables 3a and 3b, in all of the news categories the impact of 
unexpected news was much stronger than expected news except in the case 
of bad-hard-policy news.  In the case of bad-hard-policy news, the impact of 
expected news was stronger than unexpected news because the sample size 
was too small to offer reliable results.  There were 13 pieces of news for 
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Table 4a The Impact Effects of Expected and Unexpected Policy     
           Announcement News with Momentum on the KOSPI (1) 
Event 
Expected or 
Unexpected 
KOSPI’s  
Own Return  
(1) 
Returns 
adjusted with  
Global Index 
(S&P G1200)  
(2) 
Returns 
adjusted with 
Global Index 
(MSCI_EM) 
(3) 
Number of 
Observations 
Good News 
* 
Positive 
Momentum 
Expected 
 
Unexpected 
1.66 
 (2.63)
** 
 
1.87 
(1.12) 
1.04 
(1.52) 
 
1.85 
(2.28)
**
 
1.02 
(1.50) 
 
1.90 
(2.40)
**
 
12 
  
10 
Good News 
* 
Negative 
Momentum 
Expected 
 
Unexpected 
0.78 
(2.71)
*** 
 
2.51 
  (5.64)
***
 
1.35 
(1.96)
* 
 
1.92 
(4.32)
***
 
0.32 
(1.96)
* 
 
1.90 
(4.32)
***
 
10 
 
24 
Notes: 1) Figures in parentheses ( ) indicate t-values.  2) Figures in parentheses [ ] indicate p-
values.  3) *** denotes statistical significance at 1%, ** 5%, and * 10%, respectively. 
 
unexpected bad-hard-policy news, but only 5 pieces of news in the expected 
bad-hard-policy news.  The statistical significance of the coefficient 
difference was also checked in this study.  The good-policy news with an 
expected-unexpected differential was significant at the 5 percent level while 
bad-policy news with an expected-unexpected differential was not 
significant. 
Next, the effects of momentum were considered.  Since two parameters 
(positive momentum and negative momentum) are added, there are four cases. 
As shown in tables 4a and 4b, if the policy announcement news is in a 
different direction from the momentum, such as good news with negative 
momentum or bad news with positive momentum, the impact of unexpected 
news was stronger than expected news.  However, if the policy 
announcement news is the in same direction as the momentum, such as good 
news with positive momentum or bad news with negative momentum, the 
impact of expected news was stronger than unexpected news except in the 
case of the KOSPI’s own return test (good news with positive momentum). 
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Table 4b The Impact Effects of Expected and Unexpected Policy  
           Announcement News with Momentum on the KOSPI (2) 
Event 
Expected or 
Unexpected 
KOSPI’s  
Own Return  
(1) 
Returns 
adjusted with  
Global Index  
(S&P G1200)  
(2) 
Returns 
adjusted with  
Global Index 
(MSCI_EM) 
(3) 
Number  
of 
Observations 
Bad News 
* 
Positive 
Momentum 
Expected 
 
Unexpected 
–0.03 
 (–0.01) 
 
–1.22 
(–0.75) 
–1.11 
(–0.85) 
 
–1.04 
(–1.12) 
–0.98 
(–0.76) 
 
–1.05 
(–1.14) 
1 
 
4 
Bad News 
* 
Negative 
Momentum 
Expected 
 
Unexpected 
–0.82 
(–1.12) 
 
–0.68 
  (–0.93) 
–0.63 
(–0.39) 
 
–0.48 
(–0.55) 
–0.94 
(–0.59) 
 
–0.62 
(–0.72) 
4 
 
9 
Notes: 1) Figures in parentheses ( ) indicate t-values.  2) Figures in parentheses [ ] indicate p-
values.  3) *** denotes statistical significance at 1%, ** 5%, and * 10%, respectively. 
 
As shown in table 3, in the case of good news, the statistical significance 
of the coefficient difference was very significant in KOSPI’s own return. 
Since a lot of news was from good policy announcements from Korean 
domestic news, and the Korean stock market is highly market efficient, the 
response between expected news and unexpected news should be 
significantly different.  In the case of bad news, the differential was not 
significant in any of the cases because of the small sample size.  
 
Hypothesis 4: Contrary to efficient market theory, there can be large 
market moves in the absence of news. 
 
Several studies have found that for the U.S. stock market, many of the 
largest price movements occurred when there was no major news, suggesting 
that important internal dynamics were at work.
12)
  This conclusion did not 
                                                          
12)
 See Cutler, Poterba, and Summers (1991) and Fair (2002). 
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hold up for the Korean stock market over the period we investigated.  There 
was substantial news on 367 news days among 667 business days during the 
research period.  There were 188 days with good news (51.2 percent) and 
179 days with bad news (48.8 percent).  We took the largest 25 movements 
in each direction.
13)
  All of the largest 25 movements in each direction had a 
news item.  Therefore, in the case of KOSPI, there was no large market 
movement in the absence of news during the global financial crisis.  In 
order to show which news strongly affected Korean stock market, we made 
KOSPI’s significant news set using event study methodology as shown in 
Appendix A1. 
 
 
6. CONCLUDING COMMENTS 
 
Making use of a newly constructed data set of good and bad news, we 
investigated a set of behavioral and efficient market hypotheses about Korean 
stock market responses to good and bad news during the global financial 
crisis.  We found strong evidence for our conjecture that even in markets 
that pass efficient market tests, which the Korean market did over this period, 
there can be interesting behavioral aspects of market behavior to explore.  
Our findings support our belief that both the efficient market hypothesis and 
behavioral approaches should be part of any financial researcher’s tool kit.  
There should not be a strong division between the use of one approach or the 
other. 
One of our most interesting findings is that over the period studied, the 
Korean Stock market responded considerably more strongly to bad rather 
than good news and that this held in rising as well as falling markets.  Of 
course, it is possible that over this period the bad news tended to be more 
important than the good news.  Generally, accepted metrics have not yet 
been developed to distinguish the relative importance of different types of 
                                                          
13)
 The smallest of the each movements turned out to be +3.3 percent and –3.3 percent 
respectively. 
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news although undoubtedly there are often important differences.  
Attempting to adjust for such differences must await further research.  Still, 
we find this result interesting, as we have no prior reason for believing that 
the bad news over the period was systematically more important than the 
good news.  
Another interesting finding is that declining markets responded more 
strongly to both good and bad news than did rising markets.  This is 
consistent with the hypothesis put forward in behavioral and neuro finance 
literature that in rising markets investors are often heavily influenced by over 
optimism and hubris and that they understand what is going on to a much 
higher degree than is warranted and as a result, they pay little attention to 
both good and bad news.  On the other hand, in slumping markets many 
investors may be less certain in their views about how well they understand 
what is going on in the market and hence pay more attention to both good 
and bad news expectations more when assessing news. 
Here we have investigated only a few of the behavioral hypotheses that are 
being developed in the research on behavioral and neuro finance.  Thus, a 
great deal of further work can be done to test other hypotheses as well as 
considering different time periods, countries, and types of markets. 
 
 
APPENDIX 
 
A1. KOSPI’S Significant News 
 
.
J
t mt j j t
j 1
R R d   

                       (7) 
                  
Where Rt is the KOSPI return on day t, Rmt is the global market return on 
day t (S&P Global 1200), J is the total number of events for KOSPI, 
j
d  is 
the dummy variable that takes the value of one during event j’s event 
window, εt is the error term.  
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Date CAR t-value 
Signifi- 
cance 
NEWS 
08/01/07 –0.0392 –3.1408 *** Subprime woes 
08/10/07 –0.0335 –3.4450 *** 
The fallout from the U.S. subprime mortgage crisis 
Friday is spreading worldwide 
08/16/07 –0.0634 –5.4515 *** 
Recent global financial turmoil triggered by mass U.S. 
subprime loan defaults drove global investors to seek 
safer assets such as U.S. treasury bonds 
08/17/07 –0.0216 –2.7097 *** 
Fitch Ratings downgrades Countrywide Financial 
Corporation to BBB+ 
08/20/07  0.0506  4.2517 *** 
The U.S. Central Bank will cut its federal fund rates as 
early as September (The Fed’s move shows an active 
commitment to stabilizing markets) 
09/19/07  0.0266  2.6256 *** 
The U.S. Federal Reserve cut its benchmark interest 
rate by a half point to 4.75% 
10/22/07 –0.0276 –2.7794 *** Skyrocketing oil prices 
11/12/07 –0.0284 –2.7212 *** Negative expectation of the global economy 
11/21/07 –0.0391 –2.6822 *** Subprime woes 
11/26/07  0.0413  3.4539 *** Thanksgiving rally (Black Friday) 
01/22/08 –0.0328 –3.6544 *** Subprime woes 
01/28/08 –0.0377 –3.057 *** 
SG Bank announced that one futures trader at the bank 
had fraudulently lost the bank €4.9 billion (the 
equivalent of $7.2 billion U.S.) the largest such loss in 
history 
02/11/08 –0.0207 –2.8204 *** U.S. economic index went down 
02/14/08  0.0379  2.9349 *** 
Japanese economic growth is much higher than 
expected 
09/01/08 –0.0392 –3.2189 *** September crisis woes 
09/08/08  0.0552  3.6630 *** U.S. Bailout Plan 
09/16/08 –0.0667 –4.6184 *** 
Lehman Brothers Holdings Incorporated files for 
Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection 
09/19/08  0.0389  3.4016 *** The U.S. rescue plan for the stock market 
10/06/08 –0.0296 –3.5750 *** 
Korean institutions’ pessimistic expectation of U.S. 
economy 
10/08/08 –0.0460 –4.6956 *** North Korean missile threat 
10/10/08 –0.0233 –3.5052 *** Sudden depreciation of the Won 
10/14/08  0.0248  4.7682 *** The U.S., Japan, and Europe promised dollar liquidity 
10/16/08 –0.0668 –7.3933 *** U.S. economy woes (deadly cross) 
10/22/08 –0.0428 –4.1520 *** Global economy woes 
10/23/08 –0.0516 –5.9927 *** Global economic crisis 
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10/30/08  0.1070  8.9998 *** 
BOK signed a $30 billion currency swap deal with the 
Federal Reserve 
11/06/08 –0.0648 –5.9832 *** U.S. economic index went down 
11/13/08 –0.0163 –2.7534 *** Global crisis woes 
11/18/08 –0.0313 –3.2147 *** IMF suggests loan to Korea 
11/20/08 –0.0485 –5.4064 *** Global crisis woes 
12/02/08 –0.0076 –3.0089 *** 
Report from the National Bureau of Economic 
Research stated that the U.S. has been in a recession 
since December 2007 
12/08/08  0.0723  5.5395 *** U.S. stimulus plan 
12/12/08 –0.0419 –3.4764 *** 
BOK signed a $30 billion currency swap deal with both 
Japan and China  
12/15/08  0.0533  3.4913 *** Big 3 bailout 
01/15/09 –0.0489 –4.8519 *** Global economy woes 
01/28/09  0.0597  4.2965 *** 
The news that the German-based memory chipmaker 
Qimonda filed for insolvency Wednesday boosted the 
Seoul financial market 
02/17/09 –0.0390 –3.2699 *** Global concern over East Europe default woes 
02/20/09 –0.0364 –2.9530 *** Global crisis woes 
03/02/09 –0.0352 –3.3813 *** 
The U.S. government’s assistance to American 
International Group (AIG) 
03/30/09 –0.0250 –2.7039 *** GM woes 
04/02/09  0.0286  2.6415 *** 
Global financial crisis could be over earlier than 
expected 
04/09/09  0.0414  3.1286 *** Good expectations for the Korean economy 
07/13/09 –0.0326 –2.8506 *** U.S. economy woes 
11/27/09 –0.0410 –3.7718 *** Dubai default threat rattles world stocks 
02/05/10 –0.0198 –2.6152 *** P.I.G.S. could default due to very high national debt 
09/19/08  0.0389  3.4016 *** The U.S. rescue plan for the stock market 
10/06/08 –0.0296 –3.5750 *** 
Korean institutions’ pessimistic expectation of U.S. 
economy 
10/08/08 –0.0460 –4.6956 *** North Korean missile threat 
10/10/08 –0.0233 –3.5052 *** Sudden depreciation of the Won 
10/14/08  0.0248  4.7682 *** The U.S., Japan, and Europe promised dollar liquidity 
10/16/08 –0.0668 –7.3933 *** U.S. economy woes (deadly cross) 
10/22/08 –0.0428 –4.1520 *** Global economy woes 
10/23/08 –0.0516 –5.9927 *** Global economic crisis 
10/30/08  0.1070  8.9998 *** 
BOK signed a $30 billion currency swap deal with the 
Federal Reserve 
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11/06/08 –0.0648 –5.9832 *** U.S. economic index went down 
11/13/08 –0.0163 –2.7534 *** Global crisis woes 
11/18/08 –0.0313 –3.2147 *** IMF suggests loan to Korea 
11/20/08 –0.0485 –5.4064 *** Global crisis woes 
12/02/08 –0.0076 –3.0089 *** 
Report from the National Bureau of Economic 
Research stated that the U.S. has been in a recession 
since December 2007 
12/08/08  0.0723  5.5395 *** U.S. stimulus plan 
12/12/08 –0.0419 –3.4764 *** 
BOK signed a $30 billion currency swap deal with both 
Japan and China  
12/15/08  0.0533  3.4913 *** Big 3 bailout 
01/15/09 –0.0489 –4.8519 *** Global economy woes 
01/28/09  0.0597  4.2965 *** 
The news that the German–based memory chipmaker 
Qimonda filed for insolvency Wednesday boosted the 
Seoul financial market 
02/17/09 –0.0390 –3.2699 *** Global concern over East Europe default woes 
02/20/09 –0.0364 –2.9530 *** Global crisis woes 
03/02/09 –0.0352 –3.3813 *** 
The U.S. government’s assistance to American 
International Group (AIG) 
03/30/09 –0.0250 –2.7039 *** GM woes 
04/02/09  0.0286  2.6415 *** 
Global financial crisis could be over earlier than 
expected 
04/09/09  0.0414  3.1286 *** Good expectations for the Korean economy 
07/13/09 –0.0326 –2.8506 *** U.S. economy woes 
11/27/09 –0.0410 –3.7718 *** Dubai default threat rattles world stocks 
02/05/10 –0.0198 –2.6152 *** P.I.G.S. could default due to very high national debt 
Notes: 1) Source: Maeil Business Newspaper, Seoul Business Newspaper, Hankook Business 
Newspaper, and the crisis timeline of events and policy actions from the Federal 
Reserve Bank of Saint Louis.  2) *** signifies statistical significance at 1%. 
 
 
A2. Footnote 7 Detail 
 
S&P Global 1200 Index is a free-float, weighted stock market index of 
global equities from Standard & Poor’s.  The index covers 31 countries and 
approximately 70% of global stock market capitalization.  The S&P Global 
1200 is comprised of seven regional indices: the S&P 500; S&P/TSX 60 
(Canada); the S&P Latin America 40 (Mexico, Brazil, Argentina, Chile); the 
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S&P/TOPIX 150 (Japan); the S&P Asia 50 (Hong Kong, Korea, Singapore, 
Taiwan); the S&P/ASX 50 (Australia); and the S&P Europe 350.  
The European index is divided into three sub indices: the S&P Euro, 
covering the Euro zone markets; the S&P Euro Plus, adding Denmark, 
Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland; and the S&P United Kingdom. 
For the emerging markets control Google Finance was used to obtain the 
MSCI_EM.  MSCI_EM that is designed to measure the equity market 
performance of 21 emerging markets.  The MSCI_EM consists of the 
following 21 emerging market country indices: Brazil, Chile, China, 
Colombia, Czech Republic, Egypt, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Korea, 
Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Russia, South Africa, 
Taiwan, Thailand, and Turkey. 
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